A Scalable Voting System: Validation of Holographic Consensus in DAOstack by Faqir-Rhazoui, Youssef et al.
A Scalable Voting System: Validation of Holographic Consensus in
DAOstack
Youssef El Faqir
Dpt Software Engineering and
Artificial Intelligence
Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain)
yelfaqir@ucm.es
Javier Arroyo
Knowledge Technology Institute
Universidad Complutense
de Madrid (Spain)
javier.arroyo@fdi.ucm.es
Samer Hassan
Berkman Klein Center
Harvard University (USA)
Knowledge Technology Institute, UCM (Spain)
shassan@cyber.harvard.edu
Abstract
Blockchain technology allows for new forms
of online governance relying on decentralized
infrastructure. In particular, it has enabled the so
called Decentralized Autonomous Organizations
(DAOs): pieces of software deployed on a blockchain
which mediate the interaction of groups of people.
Allegedly, their main aim is to facilitate large-scale
decentralized cooperation in online communities. In
order to do that, they provide governance mechanisms
for democratic decision-making in communities.
One of the most popular novel decision-making
systems is ”Holographic Consensus”, a voting
mechanism intended to filter relevant proposals for
large communities. To which extent is Holographic
Consensus working as intended, facilitating effective
scalable cooperation? In order to validate this method,
we analyze the 22 DAO communities and 6000 users
from the DAOstack platform, which uses Holographic
Consensus in all its DAOs.
1. Introduction
Blockchain is an emergent technology that provides
a distributed and immutable ledger, which can be
thought as a distributed database with a synchronization
mechanism. Like the Internet, (public)1 blockchains
constitute an open infrastructure, which is not owned or
controlled by a central authority. Since it is replicated by
each node in a network, the ledger is transparent to users
and third-parties [1, 2]. It aims to provide a mechanism
in which decentralized transactions and operations are
secure, without needing to trust a third-party as in
centralized systems. [2, 3].
Blockchain emerged with the appearance of
1Typically, referring to ”blockchains” is understood as referring
to the public blockchains like Bitcoin or Ethereum, which are
transparent, have miners, and have a high degree of decentralization.
However, ”private” or ”permissioned” blockchains also exist, which
have access control, are not transparent, and typically rely on a group
of entities controlling access. In this paper, we refer just to the first.
Bitcoin, the popular ”cryptocurrency”, but has grown
enormously since then. Such growth has been
promoted by the Ethereum project, which provides
a blockchain-based distributed computing platform
[4]. Ethereum provided a fully-fledged programming
language, Solidity, to build decentralized applications,
Dapps [5]. In addition, it facilitated the creation of
”smart contracts”, computational agreements between
parties which may be self-executed and self-enforced.
Thus, these Dapps have been applied in a wide
range of fields [6, 7]. These of course include financial
applications such as general banking services [8], or
cryptocurrency payment [9], but also applications in
fields such as Internet of Things [10]. More relevant
to this paper, Ethereum boosted blockchain applications
to governance, allowing the rise of Decentralized
Autonomous Organizations, or simply DAOs [11].
DAOs are organizations where the interaction of
members (humans or machines) is mediated by a
blockchain application, which is controlled by a set of
rules embedded in its source code. DAOs are said to
be able to autonomously hire people, provide services,
gain money for their own aims, own smart property,
coordinate with other autonomous software, or facilitate
cooperation, to name a few [3, 12]. Still, while this is yet
to be seen in this emerging paradigm, these promises
have attracted both idealistic defenders [13, 14] and
those warning of its dangers [15, 16].
DAOs are supposed to enable large-scale
cooperation in online communities. Although this
has already been achieved in large commons-based
peer production projects such as Wikipedia or the
Linux kernel [17], they still face multiple challenges
[18]. Blockchain enthusiasts claim DAOs can reduce
the cost of large-scale decentralized cooperation,
incentivize cooperative behavior, increase participation,
and facilitate open democratic organizations [19, 20].
In this work, we will focus on an emergent DAO
ecosystem, DAOstack, and its governance mechanism,
the so called holographic consensus, to empirically
validate whether it really facilitates large-scale proposal
voting or not. Holographic consensus enables people
to make predictions about which proposals will pass,
and rewards them for making accurate ones. In this
way, high-quality proposals aligned with the purpose
of the DAO are supposed to be selected and will
require a simple majority vote instead of absolute
majority. While the idea seems good in theory, does this
innovative blockchain-enabled mechanism effectively
facilitate large-scale voting? Is it actually used in
practice? Does it work for DAO communities?
In order to respond to these questions, we analyze
the activities of 6,000 DAOstack users organized in
22 DAO communities. Section 2 covers DAOs, the
governance scalability challenges, and the governance
solutions provided by DAOs. Section 3 explains the
holographic consensus proposed by DAOstack, while
Section 4 provides an analytical overview of DAOstack
current activity and user-base. Section 5 focuses on
the empirical validation of holographic consensus based
on the DAO communities operations, and Section 6
provides some concluding remarks.
2. DAOs in a nutshell
There are multiple definitions of DAO. One
appreciated by the DAO community, and as defined
by the co-founder of the Aragon DAO platform, is the
following: “a DAO is an internet-native entity with
no central management which is regulated by a set of
automatically enforceable rules on a public blockchain,
and whose goal is to take a life of its own and incentives
people to achieve a shared common mission”2. In short,
it would be a group of people with common goals that
coordinate online relying on blockchain infrastructure.
In practice, DAOs are pieces of software which
define the interactions of its participants. Their source
code is typically deployed on a blockchain such as
the aforementioned Ethereum. Thus, each DAO has a
unique address it can be refered with. Following its
most common implementation nowadays, DAOs make
use of ”reputation” tokens, which participants need to
have in order to participate. They have an implemented
governance model, with a decision-making system (e.g.
majority vote). It is also common for DAOs to manage
resources, typically cryptocurrencies, and the DAO
members can decide how to allocate them through the
decision-making system.
Nowadays, the vast majority of DAOs use Ethereum
as a platform. In Ethereum, every operation or
transaction a user wants to do, implies a small
”commission”, a cost in crypto-currency (”gas”). As
opposed to traditional centralized web apps which imply
2https://twitter.com/licuende/status/1263511552709267456
a running cost for server rental, Ethereum apps do not
have running costs, but a cost per operation performed,
typically paid by the user performing them. That is
due to the fact operations are validated and confirmed
through blockchain ”miners” which are paid these
commissions. The cost of an operation may be more
or less expensive depending on the kind of activity to be
performed. These facts condition the DAO activity and
the kind of activity that is recorded in the blockchain.
2.1. The governance scalability problem
Typically, electronic voting systems focus on
providing a secure infrastructure with encrypted and
verifiable votes, which is trustworthy for voters [21].
Under a blockchain, those technical issues are allegedly
reduced, due to its nature as a distributed ledger
without central management, and with its transactions
validated cryptographically [22]. We are not tackling
here the technical scalability challenges that blockchain
faces [23]. Instead we focus on how blockchain
and DAOs deal with the classical challenges in
political organization, on how to scale direct democratic
participation to large groups of people [24, 25].
It is already common to find arguments in which
this scalability is facilitated by modern technologies
[26], and DAO proponents aim to take it a step further
[20]. Within the DAO proponents, the co-founder of
the DAOstack DAO platform, Matan Field, describes
as the most prominent DAO governance problem the
tension between scalability and resilience [27]. He
defines resilience as the tolerance and even resistance
of a governance system to faulty behaviour. And he
sees scalability as the ability of a governance system to
take a large number of decisions in a given period as
more agents participate in the system. As a community
grows, if an absolute majority (>50%) is required to
make a decision, more agents will need to vote. On
the other hand, resilience in a decentralized community
imply decisions not being hijacked by a small minority.
Thus, growing a community increases the number of
voters required to satisfy the majority, while growing
the number of decisions demands more attention from
voters in a time frame. Hence, scaling an organization,
either in terms of members or decisions, hinders the
governance of the organization. Reducing the number
of voters required to take decisions (e.g. >30%) is
no solution, because it compromises the organization
resilience that could be hijacked by a minority. This,
according to Field, exemplifies the duality between
scalability and resilience. We review below several
solutions that try to address this limitation.
2.2. Scalability solutions in DAO platforms
In the last years, several DAO platforms have
emerged to facilitate DAO adoption. They provide
tools and templates to create a DAO, and a front-end to
interact with it.3 These platforms typically implement
solutions to tackle the governance scalability problem.
Platforms like DAOHaus4 provide a simple
decision-making system that requires no minimum
quorum to approve proposals. It just counts cast votes,
and if there are more than 50% up-votes, the proposal
passes [28]. However, if any member does not agree
with the result, they can make rage quitting, exiting
with their portion of resources.
On the contrary, the DAO platform Colony5 focuses
on the scalability problem with two measures. First,
splitting DAOs into domains which are potentially
independent, and can work without interactions among
them in a stigmergic manner. Second, by avoiding
voting, as much as they can. All decisions are approved
by default unless someone has an objection, in which
case it is discussed and solved with a traditional voting
mechanism [29].
The DAO platform Aragon6 requires reaching a
static quorum to approve proposals. However, Aragon
DAOs are highly customizable, as they can install and
configure ’apps’ to change multiple features, including
the decision-making system. Thus, it is possible to
implement the Conviction Voting system [30] which
aims to address the scalability problem. It does so
by giving voters the ability to set a preference for a
proposal, instead of setting votes in a time-box session.
Another voting system implemented as an Aragon app is
Holographic Consensus,7 which is the DAOstack DAO
platform decision-making system discussed next.
3. Holographic Consensus in DAOstack
As mentioned above, absolute majority as a
community decision-making mechanism is not scalable.
To solve that, DAOstack8 has implemented the
Holographic Consensus that aims to allow scalability
without harming resilience.
Such mechanism is described in [31, 32] and
requires to introduce some concepts in order to
understand how it works. First, the DAO’s global
3It is necessary to have a special browser or an interface to use
these front-ends. For instance, MetaMask https://metamask.io/ is a
browser extension used to interact with Ethereum’s Dapps.
4https://daohaus.club
5https://colony.io
6https://aragon.org
7https://blog.aragon.one/my-first-aragon-app-voting-
supercharged-with-daostacks-holographic-consensus-part-4/
8https://daostack.io
opinion, or simply the DAO’s opinion, is defined as
the decision made by an absolute majority of voters
(>50%). An approximation of the DAO’s opinion
involving a sufficient number of agents on the decision
could be used instead (e.g. relative majority). However,
a small number of agents could hijack the DAO’s global
opinion. Attackers could spam a group of proposals in
a small frame time, and this would require the attention
of most voters to prevent the attack. Therefore, using a
relative majority increases the scale factor of a DAO, but
it also increases the potential attacks.
Because of that, Holographic Consensus sets an
absolute majority to approve a given proposal, and
only if some conditions are met, a relative majority
suffices. The process that turns an absolute majority into
a relative one is called boosting. Boosting a proposal
consists of people spending tokens to promote it, until
either a threshold is reached or the boosting period ends.
Anyone can boost a proposal, not only the members
of the DAO, i.e. foreign agents are also allowed to
boost proposals. Due to that, we may consider that two
”economies” arise in this context. In the first one, only
DAO members have a portion of its tokens (reputation
holders), and these reputational tokens cannot be bought
or transferred, and are used to vote. The other economy
is bound to the boosting process, using another kind of
transferable tokens (akin to a cryptocurrency), which
may be bought, and thus anyone, not just organization
members, may use them to boost a proposal. The
boosting process is explained in detail below.
When a proposal is created, a boosting period starts
and anyone can ”upstake” or ”downstake” her tokens to
that proposal, i.e. bet a certain number of tokens that
the proposal will pass (upstake) or not pass (downstake)
after being voted. If the upstaked tokens of a proposal
reach a dynamic threshold, which grows exponentially
with the number of active proposals, it is conis that the
proposal is relevant enough, and then it will be boosted.
Finally, when the proposal has an outcome (the result
voted by the DAO members), stakers will lose or gain
tokens, depending on their bet. The ones who were
aligned with the DAO’s opinion will gain tokens, while
the ones who were not, will lose them.
Field [32] argues that stakers are also predictors
because if they do not want to lose tokens, they need
to anticipate the DAO’s global opinion. Therefore, if
stakers are rational, they will boost ’good proposals’
and filter out ’bad proposals’. Consequently, proposals
boosted need less votes to be approved, which saves
community attention and voting effort, while those not
boosted will require a majority vote. Note that a
non-boosted proposal is a proposal that has not received
enough upstakes due to downstakes or inaction.
As a result, DAO members need stakers for the
sake of scalability, and stakers need to anticipate DAO’s
opinion in order to earn a reward. Note that the boosting
process can be thought as a poll to anticipate the DAO’s
opinion, or more accurately as a prediction market [33].
We will validate its predictive power in Section 5.
4. DAOstack in numbers
Before analyzing the use and predictive power of
Holographic Consensus in DAOstack , we will analyze
its DAOs to better understand the ecosystem. We will
focus on users and activity.9
Since its start in April 2019, DAOstack has deployed
22 DAOs on Ethereum main network (mainnet),
which means that they are fully deployed in the real
blockchain. It is important to remark that until very
recently, it was not possible to directly create a DAO
into DAOstack, and it was required to ask for it to its
administrators. Nowadays, a template facilitates the
creation process.
There are 6,083 users registered in all the DAOs
within the platform, each one represented by an
Ethereum address. However, the same address can be
used in more than one DAO. If we take this into account,
DAOstack has 5,952 unique users, which means that
around 2% of the addresses are used more than once
on different DAOs. It is also worth to mention that,
as in many online communities [34], a user may have
different addresses (i.e. user ids), but there is no reliable
way to detect them. Another important fact is that
Kyber DAO Exp#2 is a DAO with 4,946 users. If we
excluded this large DAO, DAOstack would have 1,137
users operating in 21 DAOs.
Below we are going to show how users and activity
are distributed across the DAOs. All data and source
code are open-licensed and publicly available.10
4.1. Users
Figure 1 shows the distribution of DAOstack DAOs
according to its number of users. The y-axis represents
the number of DAOs that have a given number of users
(in bins of 10 users), with the red trace showing that one
DAO has 0 users. To better display the histogram, we
have removed Kyber DAO Exp#2 from the plot because
it has 4,946 users.
The community size distribution shows that most
DAOs have few users, while the majority of users are
9All the historical data was collected on June 24th, 2020
10Standalone scripts can be found in https://github.com/Grasia/
daostack-census and the DAO-Analyzer software in: https://
github.com/Grasia/chain-community-dashboard. All the data used
in this paper has been gathered from DAOstack GraphQL in https:
//thegraph.com/explorer/subgraph/daostack/master.
Figure 1. Community size distribution in DAOstack.
Kyber DAO Exp#2 (4,946 users) was filtered out.
concentrated in a few big DAOs. More precisely, 50%
of the DAOs have less or equal to 21 users, 75% of the
DAOs has less than 47 users, and 95% of them has less
than 409 users. This kind of heavy-tail user distribution
is not different from that of other online communities,
like users by Wikipedia language [35].
Regarding the evolution of new users in DAOstack,
Figure 2 shows the monthly time series.11 It can be seen
that new users join DAOstack each month, even if in
the last few months the number has decreased towards
a mean of 25 per month. It is important to bear in
mind that, first, DAOstack is still in early Beta and not
a finished product, and second, that joining the platform
currently requires a kind of IT knowledge that may be
a barrier to new users. DAOstack is making efforts to
simplify the creation and the management of DAOs, but
the number of monthly new users is not yet growing.
Figure 2. Time series of new users
The highest value was registered in June 2019
with 5,397 new users, which implies the 89% of all
ecosystem users.12 However, 4,944 of them joined to
11Note the series last month, June 2020, is drawn lighter because the
month was not finished at the time of the data collection (June 24th),
and thus its final value may be higher.
12The y-axis in the figure ignores the very high June 2019 value to
Kyber DAO Exp#2, the biggest DAO already mentioned.
Still, even if we remove this DAO’s users, June 2019
still registered the biggest amount of new users (453).
This is almost three times more than the second month
with more newcomers, April 2019, the first month of
DAOstack , with 155. Besides these peaks, the number
of new users is between 16 and 80 in the rest of months.
4.2. Activity
The definition of activity depends on the purpose of
the online community. For example, wiki communities
usually consider ”edits” [36], while free/open source
development considers ”commits” [37].
In the case of DAOstack , a DAO is a governance
tool to submit proposals, and vote for or against them.
In the creation of a proposal, a DAO member specifies
a task to perform in exchange for the aforementioned
commission (in cryptocurrency). While in the voting
process, DAO members can vote for or against
proposals. However, stakes are a kind of vote that is
not restricted to members of the DAO, as explained in
Section 3. Thus, we will consider the registration of a
new proposal, voting, and staking as activity indicators.
According to that definition, there are a total of 7,719
actions in DAOstack since its creation. Registering
proposals represents a 14% (1,085) of the actions
performed, voting represents a 60% (4,617), and staking
represents 26% (2,017). Unsurprisingly, the number
of proposals is the smallest, but it is quite high
considering the number of communities. Interestingly,
the number of stakes is much smaller than the number
of votes, which could be explained because staking
implies spending both money (GEN token) and time for
adequately pondering a proposal. Furthermore, staking
is a mechanism designed for big DAOs, and we have
seen that half of the DAOs have 21 or less members.
Figure 3. Distribution of proposals across DAOs.
favor plot legibility.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the distribution of the stated
kinds of activity, i.e. proposals, votes, and stakes, across
DAOs. The proposal distribution in Figure 3 shows
that all DAOs but two have at most 90 proposals. The
exceptions are Genesis Alpha, which is the DAO that
governs the DAOstack project, with 382 proposals, and
dxDAO, with 179 proposals. However, 77% of DAOs
have made 50 or less proposals, and there are two DAOs
that never made a proposal. The mode of the distribution
is in the bin of up to 10 proposals with six DAOs (27%).
It is clear that some DAOs are extremely active, while
most of them exhibit a more modest activity profile.
Again, this concentration is similar to the behaviour
shown by for instance wiki communities [38].
Figure 4. Distribution of votes across DAOs
(excluding two large cases)
Figure 5. Distribution of stakes across DAOs
(excluding one large case)
In the distribution of votes and stakes we see again
the pattern of few communities capitalizing most of the
activity, while the majority of them have more moderate
activity levels. We have omitted the outliers for the sake
of legibility: two DAOs excluded from Figure 4 with
2,201 (Genesis Alpha) and 1,167 (dxDAO) votes, and
one DAO with 1,078 (Genesis Alpha) stakes excluded
from Figure 5.
The 75% of DAOs have at most 121 votes and 47
stakes, while 95% of them have at most 1,119 votes and
313 stakes. The mode in both cases is between 0 and
10: six DAOs in the case of votes and nine in the case
of stakes. These values are very low, specially for the
case of votes, which probably means that these numbers
correspond to abandoned DAOs.
It is worth noting that six DAOs registered no stakes
(red trace), with five of them having less or equals to six
users. The other is Fortmatic DAO, which has 22 users,
but it has not registered any actions. It is remarkable
that there is an eccentric case, dOrg with 41 users,
212 votes but two stakes. This DAO has an engaged
community, where proposals are usually approved by
absolute majority. However, DAOs with that number of
users usually use stakes to boost proposals.
All the activity distributions are highly skewed. We
have not found a clear correlation between the number
of users and activity, because there are mostly inactive
DAOs with a lot of users and some small DAOs that
generate a lot of activity. Still, there is some evidence
of a positive correlation between users and activity. We
have omitted the scatter plots and the correlation values,
given the small sample and the presence of outliers.
4.3. Activity over time
In this subsection we focus in community activity
over time. As above, our definition of activity includes
creating a proposal, voting or staking. We consider that
a DAO is ‘alive’ or active in a given month if at least one
action took place in that month.
Figure 6. Monthly time series of active DAOs
Figure 6 shows the time series of active DAOs in
each month (that is, excluding non-active DAOs with no
activity). The time series has an average of 7.8, which
means that only one third of the DAOs are active each
month. As before, June is marked in light color as data
collection finished before that month ended.
Due to the aggregation of all the DAOs in the
Figure 7. DAOs active months since birth date.
DAOs in dark blue have registered activity in the last
two months (May-June 2020).
mentioned chart, it is not easy to see if the active
or inactive ones are always the same. Figure 7
complements such information. In Figure 7 we
represent each DAO with a bar with the number of
months in which the DAO was active. DAOs which have
performed at least one action on the last two months
(May-June) are in dark blue, while others are in baby
blue. Furthermore, a cross over each bar represents the
age in months of the DAO, that is, the maximum number
of months that it could have been active. We can see that
only two of them have always been active, the young
CENNZnet Grants DAO, and 1UP. In the other side,
we can see two DAOs that never registered an action:
(Fortmatic DAO, and BuffiDAO). In general, we can
see that the activity level varies, while some DAOs are
usually active, some others seem to be less active, and a
few of them seem to be abandoned. The abandonment of
an online project is typical in other fields such as wikis
or free/open source software communities [38, 39]. It
is worth noting that, in DAOs, the level of activity may
depend on the purpose of the DAO and the size of the
community, since some of them may not need to vote
proposals that frequently.
Figure 8. Monthly time series of active users
Finally, Figure 8 shows the number of active users
over time. There is a mean of 98 users who have
performed at least one action, which represents a 1.6%
of total users. However, we remember that Kyber DAO
Exp#2 has 4,946 users, and this DAO is inactive. If
we exclude them, the registered activity on DAOstack
is maintained by a small fraction of users (around 8%).
Again, this kind of unequal participation is typical from
other online communities [40, 41, 42].
5. Validation of boosting as a predictor
As explained in Section 3, boosting through staking
can be seen as a prediction system (in fact, a prediction
market). We want to assess whether its predictions
succeed or not. The boosting process has two possible
outcomes: the proposal can be boosted or not. A
boosted proposal is a proposal that stakers think that
DAO’s members will approve. On the contrary, a
non-boosted proposal, theoretically, is a proposal that
stakers consider that will not be approved by the DAO
community. Bear in mind that if no one stakes, the
proposal, then it is non-boosted. As a result we define
the following prediction outcomes for a proposal:
• True Positive (TP) = boosted and approved
• True Negative (TN) = non-boosted and rejected
• False Positive (FP) = boosted and rejected
• False Negative (FN) = non-boosted and approved
Once we have classified the outcomes, we can
measure how ”good” the prediction is using the
following measures:
• Accuracy = (TP + TN) / (TP + TN + FP + FN)
• Precision (boosted) = TP / (TP + FP)
• Precision (non-boosted) = TN / (TN + FN)
5.1. Splitting DAOs in groups
We are going to assess the prediction ability of the
boosting process across DAOstack , but since DAOs
vastly differ in terms of users or proposals presented, we
will segregate DAOs into various groups. Our groups
will also serve us to validate the following hypotheses
regarding Holographic Consensus:
i The use of boosting in a community is positively
correlated with the size of the community, i.e. the
number of users.
ii The use of boosting in a community is positively
correlated with the number of proposals presented
in the community.
We will consider two possible definitions for
characterizing the use of boosting in a community. First,
using the number of proposals which have at least one
stake. Second, the number of proposals of a given DAO
that reached the boosted state. We use the percentage
to homogenize the figures given the differences in the
number of proposals found in the DAOs.
Staked proposals Boosted proposals
Users 0.71* 0.64*
Proposals 0.55 0.53
Table 1. Spearman’s correlation, where (*) means
significant at p=0.01
To determine which definition of staking is more
adequate, Table 1 shows their correlation with the
numbers of users and proposals. We use Spearman’s
rank-order correlation to analyze the presence of a
monotonic relationship, but not necessarily a linear one,
as when using Pearson’s correlation.
We can see that the number of users has positive
correlation with both definitions of the use of boosting.
By comparison, the number of proposals has a weaker
correlation. Due to that, we find more evidence of i than
of ii. Figure 9 shows the relation between the number
of proposals and the percentage of proposals which has
received at least one stake. Kyber DAO Exp#2 (4,946
users) was filtered out to improve the visualization. We
see a monotonic direct relationship, but far from linear.
Figure 9. DAOs plotted by number of users vs the
percentage of their proposals that were staked.
Given the correlation values, we will split DAOs
according to the number of users. We could consider
user variability over time. However, we have found
that all DAOs in DAOstack have registered their vast
majority of users in their first months of life. Thus, we
will use the median to divide our population into two
groups with the same number of DAOs (11). First group
includes all DAOs which have 21 or less members, while
the second group includes DAOs which have more than
21 members. We will study the use of the boosting
mechanism in each of these groups.
Users Proposals
Group A 95 178
Group B 6035 907
Table 2. Total users and proposals in Group A and B
Table 2 shows the total number of users and
proposals of each group. It is remarkable that Group
A has just a 1% of all users and a 16% of all proposals.
5.2. Results of the validation
Acc. Prec. boost. Prec. non-boost.
Group A 0.67 0.93 0.5
Group B 0.93 0.96 0.85
Table 3. Accuracy and precision of the boosted and
non-boosted proposals for each group
Table 3 shows the accuracy (Acc.) and the precision
for boosted (Prec. Boost) and non-boosted (Prec. Not
Boost) proposals for each DAO group.
The accuracy in both groups clearly differ: Group A
has a moderate global accuracy while Group B shows
a strong accuracy. A closer look at the precision
values makes possible to determine where the difference
lies. While the precision of the boosted proposals is
quite high in both groups (0.93 in A and 0.96 in B),
non-boosted proposals are not as good for predicting
rejection. More precisely, the precision of Group A is
just 0.5 which means that for small DAOs a non-boosted
proposal is not a good indicator on whether it will
be rejected by the community. If we recall that a
proposal can be non-boosted if it has not received
enough stakes, a potential explanation would be that
proposals from smaller DAOs do not receive the same
attention (and stakes) than those for the bigger ones.
Furthermore, since in Group A communities are small,
the members of the DAO may not feel inclined to staking
because majority voting and the number of concurrent
proposals are manageable. Interestingly, the precision
of non-boosted proposals is much higher in Group
B (0.85), which means that for bigger communities
non-boosting is a good proxy for rejection. Thus,
boosting and holographic consensus seem to serve their
purpose for large DAOs, as it is the original intention.
To see how prediction works over time, Figures 10
and 11 show the evolution of the precision for Group A
and Group B, respectively.
According to Figure 10, Group A presents a stable
ratio when it comes to predicting approvals, a mean
of 0.92, and a standard deviation of 0.18 over the
time series. Whilst the behaviour of the prediction of
rejection has a lower mean (0.63) and is more irregular
(std. dev. of 0.35). The low precision for non-boosted
proposals is due to the persistent presence of false
negatives (non-boosted and approved) that disappear in
February 2020. On the other hand, since that month
the precision for boosted proposals increase due to the
apparition of new DAOs, 1UP and CENNZnet Grants
DAO, that use boosting in an effective way.
Figure 10. Boosted precision of Group A
Figure 11. Boosted precision of Group B
Figure 11 shows an outstanding precision for
boosted proposals with a value of 1 or close (mean
of 0.97 and standard deviation of 0.03). Precision of
non-boosted proposals registers a mean of 0.89 and a
standard deviation of 0.22, which are good values and
much better than those from Group A.
The decrease in the non-boosted precision in
February and March 2020 is due to the false negatives
(non-boosted and approved) by dOrg, which has 41
users, and, as seen in Section 4.2, it uses no staking and
always approves proposals by absolute majority.
Figure 12 shows the accuracy of each DAO, as
defined in Section 5. DAOs are sorted by the number of
users, and the color of the dot represents the number of
proposals of the DAO. A vertical line separates DAOs
from Group A and Group B. We omitted a DAO from
each group because they had no proposals.
Figure 12. Accuracy for each DAO. A vertical line
separates Group A (left) and Group B (right).
In Group A, accuracy is relatively low, which means
that staking is not very useful, but three DAOs have
an accuracy over 0.8. One was HackerDAO A that
registered just one proposal, thus the value is not
significant. The other two are the biggest ones in terms
of users, 1UP with 20 users and CENNZnet Grants DAO
with 15 users. This suggests that small DAOs do not use
effectively the boosting process, because probably they
can approve everything by majority voting.
In Group B, besides dOrg discussed above, the
remaining nine DAOs have an accuracy over 0.6, and
seven of them over 0.88. The number of proposals
of each DAO is over 25 in most of them. The figure
suggests that when DAOs reach a certain number of
members they tend to rely on boosting and that it works
quite well in terms of anticipating the relevance of a
proposal for the community.
6. Conclusion
Our work contributes to validate to which extent
DAOs and their novel governance mechanisms facilitate
scalable cooperation. In particular, our analysis focuses
on the DAOstack platform and its implementation of the
decision-making mechanism Holographic Consensus.
This method combines a sort of prediction market with
a voting mechanism and facilitates scalable voting by
separating relevant from non-relevant proposals and
reducing the quorum required to approve them. To
which extent does that work? Does Holographic
Consensus acts as an accurate predictor of which
proposals will the community find interesting and
approve?
In this article, we have analyzed the 22 DAO
communities, and their 6,000 users, that are currently
early-adopters in the DAOstack platform. Overall,
Holographic Consensus seems to follow the expected
behaviour: its prediction effectiveness is higher than
(≈90%) in large DAOs, using three different metrics. In
fact, the trend seems to reinforce the idea that the larger
a DAO is, the more Holographic Consensus (staking) is
used. On the contrary, within small DAOs, it does not
behave as appropriately, with mixed results depending
on the metric used.
We acknowledge the limitations of this analysis:
DAOstack is still a Beta software, and it still suffers
multiple usability issues that refrain wider adoption.
We have analyzed its first year, which shows unequal
levels of activity across DAOs. And the sample
available is relatively small. Still, it is clear this
analysis provides promising evidence that Holographic
Consensus may become an appropriate mechanism to
facilitate large-scale decentralized cooperation.
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